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Abstract
The geographical distribution of R&D investment changes dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s.
In the early 1970s U.S. ﬁrms are the uncontested world leaders in R&D investment in most manu-
facturing sectors. Later, led by Japan and Europe, foreign ﬁrms start challenging American R&D
leadership in many sectors of the economy. In this period of increasing competition we also observe
a substantial increase in the U.S. R&D subsidy. In a version of the multi-country quality ladder
growth model I study the eﬀects of foreign R&D competition on domestic welfare and on the op-
timal R&D subsidy. I build a new empirical index of international R&D rivalry that can be used
to perform quantitative analysis in this type of frameworks. In a calibrated version of the model
I focus on the period 1979-1991 and perform the following quantitative exercises: ﬁrst, I evaluate
the quantitative eﬀects of the observed increase in foreign R&D competition on U.S. welfare. I
ﬁnd that the positive growth eﬀect and the negative business-stealing eﬀect of foreign competition
on U.S. welfare substantially balance each other, and the overall welfare eﬀect of competition is
negligible - less then 1 percent of per-capita consumption. Moreover, using estimates of the eﬀective
U.S. R&D subsidy rate, I compute the distance from optimality of the observed subsidy at each
level of competition. I ﬁnd that international competition increases the optimal subsidy and that,
surprisingly, the U.S. subsidy observed in the data is fairly close to the optimal subsidy.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F12, F13, 038, O41.
Keywords: international competition, R&D-driven growth theory, strategic R&D policy, in-
ternational trade and growth.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
I nt h ed e b a t eo nt h ee c o n o m i cc o s t sa n db e n e ﬁts of globalization, some recent works have battled
over the welfare eﬀects on leading economies of technical progress in trailing countries. Most of the
attention has been dedicated to the consequences for advanced industrial countries of cost-driven
and technology-induced oﬀshoring to developing countries, and especially to Asia’s giants, India and
China.1 Another similarly heated debate took place in the 1980s and early 1990s. At the time
economists and political analysts warned the American public about the consequences of losing the
“race” of the 21st century, the race for world technological leadership, to catching-up Japan and
∗Giammario Impullitti, Department of Economics IMT Lucca and EUI Florence. Email:
g.impullitti@imtlucca.it,and giammario.impullitti@eui.eu.
1See Baumol and Gomory (2000), Samuelson (2004), Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan (2004), Blinder (2005).
1Europe.2 Key issues in both debates are, on the one hand, the quantitative assessment of the welfare
eﬀect of foreign competition and, on the other hand, the identiﬁcation of the optimal policy response
to it. In this paper I focus on the second debate and study the eﬀects of Japanese and European
technological catch-up on U.S. welfare and the optimal U.S. R&D subsidy.
There are two main reasons for focusing on R&D subsidies: ﬁrst, the WTO and other international
institutions restrict the use of trade policy and of production subsidies, while individual countries are
free to set their R&D subsidies autonomously. Secondly, R&D subsidies allow policy makers to protect
the domestic economy without giving up gains from trade.
Two stylized facts provide the basic motivation for the paper: the evolution of foreign competition
experienced by U.S. ﬁrms and the dynamics of U.S. R&D subsidies in the 1970s and 1980s. The
dimension of international competition on which this paper focuses is R&D rivalry among ﬁrms from
diﬀerent countries. A preliminary measure of this feature of competition is represented by countries’
share of global R&D investment. Using OECD ANBERD data on R&D investment in 2-digit and
3-digit manufacturing industries for the U.S., Japan, and 10 European countries, I ﬁnd substantial
changes in the geographical distribution of R&D investment in the 1970s and 1980s. More precisely,
the U.S. share declines from 52 percent in 1973 to 37 percent in 1991, while Japan’s share increases
from 17 percent in 1973 to 28 in 1991. This suggests that U.S. global leadership in R&D activity
was increasingly challenged by foreign ﬁrms in this period. Digging deeper into the dynamics of
countries’ R&D shares by industry it is possible to show that a signiﬁcative role was played by shifts
in global R&D leadership in medium and high-tech sectors. The second relevant piece of evidence is
that estimates of R&D subsidies from Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2002) show an increase in the
subsidy given to U.S. ﬁrms starting with the introduction of the Research and Experimentation Tax
Credit in 1981. The eﬀective subsidy produced by the R&D tax credit increases from 6 percent in
1979 to 30 in 1991.
These two stylized facts lead us to the following research questions: ﬁrst, what is the eﬀect of
the observed increase in foreign R&D on U.S. welfare? Second, how does foreign competition aﬀect
the optimal R&D subsidy in the U.S. and, consequently, how far is this from subsidy observed in the
data? I set up a framework to study the eﬀect of international R&D competition on domestic welfare
and on the optimal domestic R&D subsidy. Moreover, I build a measure of international R&D rivalry
that can be used in the model to perform quantitative analysis, and use it to calibrate the model and
quantify the eﬀects of the observed increase competition on the welfare and on the optimal subsidy in
the U.S. between 1979 and 1991.
I set up a two-country quality ladder growth model where monopolistic competitive ﬁrms compete
for market leadership through investment in quality-improving R&D (Grossman and Helpman 1991,
Aghion and Howitt 1992). Scale eﬀects are removed assuming that increasing labor force ‘dilutes’
the research eﬀort per variety of goods.3 There are two countries, domestic and foreign, sharing the
same size, technology and preferences but with diﬀerent allocations of R&D investment across sectors
and diﬀerent research subsidies. Following the evidence discussed above, I model foreign competition
2See Tyson (1992) and Thurow (1992), Krugman (1996).
3Population growth mimics the expansion in the variety of goods and eliminates the impact of population levels on
the steady state growth rate (e.g., Dinopoulos and Thompson,1998, Howitt 1999, and Peretto, 1998).
2as follows: I assume that the domestic country is the world leader in that its ﬁrms invest in R&D
in all sectors of the economy, while the foreign country is the follower, in that its R&D ﬁrms are
concentrated only in few sectors. The share of sectors where R&D ﬁrms from both countries compete
for innovation is used as a measure of international technological competition.4
Increases in competition, that is, increases in the share of sectors where domestic leaders are
challenged by foreign innovators, produce two potentially opposite eﬀects on domestic welfare. First,
competition has a positive eﬀe c to nl o n g - r u ng r o w t h . Decreasing returns in R&D at the country level,
caused by the presence of ﬁxed costs or by a ﬁxed endowment of a workforce with heterogeneous ability
(Eaton and Kortum, 1999), imply that increases in competition lead to a more eﬃcient international
distribution of research labor, thus spurring innovation and growth. More precisely, a concave research
technology implies that in competitive sectors, where R&D ﬁrms from both countries are active, ideas
are produced more eﬃciently than in non-competitive industries.5 As a consequence, increases in
competition raise global R&D eﬃciency and growth. This is the growth eﬀect of competition (GRE
henceforth) which, by improving the quality of goods, raises domestic welfare via the consumer surplus
channel.
This channel of growth through foreign entry represents a novelty in the literature on trade and
growth. This literature has focused on the selection a n do nt h ecompetition eﬀect. In Melitz (2003),
exposure to trade induces the less productive ﬁrms to exit the market, thus increasing the average
productivity level of the economy. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom
(2007) have extended the Melitz model to explore the eﬀects of ﬁrms’ selection on the long-run growth
rate of productivity. Aghion et al. (2006), Peretto (2003), Klundert and Smulders (1997), Tang and
Waelde (2001), and Licandro and Navas (2007) among others have studied the eﬀect of foreign entry
on incumbent ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate. In Aghion et al., incumbents increase their innovation
activity to stay ahead of competition. In the other papers, ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate are aﬀected
by changes in the market structure produced by foreign competition; changes in the total number of
ﬁrms and in markups are the sources of a pure competition eﬀect on innovation.
The growth channel highlighted in the present paper is diﬀerent from those in the literature for
the following reasons: ﬁrst, ﬁrms are homogeneous and, consequently, foreign entry cannot produce
any selection eﬀect that raises productivity. Second, existing papers focus on foreign entry in the
product market and study the innovation eﬀect of changes in the market structure produced by entry.
This paper, instead, spotlights on entry in the innovation activity, thus no changes in the structure
of the product market are considered. Furthermore, since the R&D activity is assumed to be carried
out under perfect competition, foreign entry does not aﬀect the R&D market structure either. It
follows that there is no pure competition eﬀect, and the innovation eﬀect of foreign entry is produced
exclusively by the interaction between changes in the geographical composition of R&D in some
4This working assumption is similar to the one in Krugman (1979), where the leading country is assumed to be able
to produce virtually all the goods in the economy, while the follower country can produce only the "old" goods. As in the
present paper, both countries have the same preferences, technology and environment, and the diﬀerence in production
possibilities is exogenous. As Krugman suggests, the source of the productive advantage of the leading economy might
be related to a more skilled labor force, external economies, or to a diﬀerence in “social atmosphere”.
5For estimates of returns to R&D in several countries supporting a non-linear R&D technology similar to the one
used in this paper see Kortum (1993), Eaton and Kortum (1999), and Jones and Williams (1998).
3industries and the non-linear R&D technology.6 Third, in the version of the quality ladder model used
in this paper, incumbent ﬁrms do not innovate, therefore no ‘stay ahead’ of competition mechanism
is obtainable.
The second eﬀect of competition on domestic welfare is the standard business-stealing eﬀect (BSE
henceforth): when foreign innovators enter a market previously dominated by domestic ﬁrms some
monopolistic rents shift abroad. Foreign business-stealing can aﬀect national income through two
potential channels: ﬁrst, it reduces aggregate proﬁts by destroying the rents of those domestic leaders
that have been pushed out of the market. Second, when domestic ﬁrms are taken over by foreign
ﬁrms, domestic jobs are temporarily lost and the labor market clears at a lower wage level. In this
paper I focus on the proﬁt-shifting eﬀect and, assuming that the presence of multinational corporations
equalizes wages across countries, I do not consider the negative eﬀect of competition on wages. The
overall eﬀect of competition on welfare is the result of both the GRE and the BSE and depends on their
relative strength. While qualitatively these two eﬀects can be derived analytically, to measure their
quantitative impact on welfare I need to calibrate the model and solve it numerically. This feature
of the paper is methodologically related to the works on fully-calibrated multi-country endogenous
growth models, such as Eaton and Kortum (1999), and Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire (2005).
The quantitative analysis begins with the construction of an empirical index of the measure of com-
petition presented in the model. Using OECD STAN data on R&D investment for the set of countries
mentioned above, I obtain a measure of the share of sectors where domestic and foreign ﬁrms compete
eﬀectively in R&D. Since the index is targeted at measuring the increase of competition experienced
by U.S. ﬁrms with the entry of Japanese and European ﬁrms into the global market for innovation, the
U.S. will be the domestic country in the model and Japan and Europe the foreign country. The basic
idea in the construction of the index is the following: the sectors where U.S. investment in research
dominates global spending in innovation are considered non-competitive, while those sectors where
the U.S. and the rest of the world are more ‘neck-and-neck’ in their innovation eﬀorts are considered
competitive; the share of neck-and-neck sectors will be the measure of international competition for
innovation. The baseline version of the index shows that U.S. global leadership in R&D was increas-
ingly challenged by foreign countries in 1970s and 1980s. More precisely, I ﬁnd an increase in the share
of competitive sectors - the share of neck-and-neck industries - from 30 percent in 1973 to 68 percent
in 1991.
I use this measure of R&D competition and other long-run statistics to calibrate the model. Nu-
merical simulations show that the eﬀect of competition on welfare is negative but small, implying that
the GRE does not completely oﬀset the negative BSE but it limits its welfare eﬀect substantially.
More precisely, I ﬁnd that the observed increase in foreign competition leads to a welfare loss for the
U.S. of 0.8 percent of quality adjusted per-capita consumption between 1979 and 1991 - when the
6This dimension of competition complements the existing ones in the process of understanding the nature and mech-
anisms of global competition in the market place. In many cases foreign entry do not involve dramatic changes in the
market structure: before Airbus started producing wide-body aircrafts the global market was an American ologipoly
in that it was led by three american producers, Boeing, Lokheed, and McDonnell-Douglas; shortly after airbus entry
Lokheed and McDonnell-Douglas exited and the market became a American-European oligopoly. The market structure
did not change much but the geographical allocation of production, innovation, and ownership did change. These are
the type of situations better described by the new measure of competition.
4competitive share of sectors rise from 042 to 0.68.7
The next step is to analyze the eﬀects of foreign competition on the optimal domestic subsidy.
There are two motives for R&D subsidies: ﬁrst, the market failures related to knowledge spillovers
typical of closed-economy models, that characterize the public good feature of R&D (e.g. Segerstrom,
1998). In the model, innovation-driven growth, by increasing the quality of goods or reducing their
quality-adjusted price, raises consumers’ surplus. Thus, R&D subsidies can be used to maximize
consumers’ surplus by correcting socially ineﬃcient levels of investment in R&D due to the presence
of knowledge externalities. Secondly, there is a strategic motive related to international R&D rivalry
(e.g. Spencer and Brander, 1983, Grossman and Eaton, 1986). More precisely, R&D subsidies can
be used to protect national income, proﬁts and wages, by helping domestic ﬁrms competing in global
R&D races for market leadership. The eﬀect of foreign competition on the optimal domestic subsidy
works though the impact of foreign entry in R&D on these two motives for subsidies.
The only other paper I am aware of that studies both the consumer surplus and strategic motive
for subsidies is Haaland and Kind (2007). That paper also explores the eﬀect of increasing competition
on innovation and on the optimal strategic R&D subsidy, but focuses on product market competition
and, as standard in the strategic industrial policy literature, presents a static model of innovation.
The present paper, instead, spotlights on international competition for innovation, and introduces
a strategic subsidy game into an endogenous growth framework to account for the long-run eﬀects
of innovation on consumer surplus. Brander (1995) and Krugman (1994) suggest that taking into
account long-run growth eﬀects could increase the welfare gains associated to the consumer surplus
motive of strategic policy.8
The main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: ﬁrst, increasing foreign competition strengthens
both the strategic and the knowledge spillovers (consumer surplus) motive for subsidies, thus raising
the optimal domestic R&D subsidy. Second, applying the model to evaluate the optimality of the
U.S. subsidy response to competition, I obtain that an increase in the R&D competition index from
0.42 in 1979 to 0.68 in 1991 produces an increase in the optimal subsidy that is fairly close to that
observed in the U.S. data. Thus, the quantitative analysis suggests that R&D subsidies were set as if
American policy makers ware responding optimally to increasing international competition.
The quantitative analysis of the distance between the observed and the optimal R&D subsidy
response to competition is related to the literature on calibrated models of strategic trade and industrial
policy. Following the seminal work by Dixit (1988), several papers have performed calibration exercises
to evaluate quantitatively the welfare gains implied by the gap between the observed policy and the
optimal strategic policy (e.g. the papers in Krugman and Smith, 1994, and the work surveyed in
Brander, 1995). The present paper contributes to this literature on the following dimensions: ﬁrst,
most existing papers focus on policies aﬀecting speciﬁc industries, while this paper studies subsidies
to R&D aﬀecting all industries symmetrically. Secondly, the existing literature has dealt with trade
7I cannot study the eﬀect of competition for the entire time frame of the index because of the lack of data for
calibrating R&D subsidies before 1979.
8Peretto (2003), Klundert and Smulders (1997) and Tang and Waelde (2001) employ two-country endogenous growth
models to study the eﬀects of foreign competition on welfare, but no formal analysis of how competition aﬀects the
optimal policy is performed.
5policies or production subsidies and, to my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt at a quantitative study
of strategic R&D subsidies. Finally, while models in the literature are limited two the two-industry
framework with static innovation, this paper is more general in that there is a continuum of industries
and the dynamic eﬀects of innovation are studied.
2 Features of the data
In this section I introduce and discuss the data that will function both as a motivation for the paper and
as empirical support for the quantitative analysis performed later on. First I explore the evolution of
countries’ shares of R&D investment in the period 1973-91. My interest is in international competition
among technological leaders and - hence - I restrict my attention to the U.S., Japan, and 10 European
countries: Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain, and the
Netherlands. In the period 1973-1991, R&D expenditures in these countries represent between 95 and
98 percent of the global R&D investment in manufacturing.9 Secondly, I report the estimates of R&D
tax subsidies from Bloom, Griﬃth, and Van Reenen (2002) for a smaller but representative group of
countries in the period 1979-1991.
2.1 Global R&D investment shares
I use OECD ANBERD data on R&D investment for two and three-digit manufacturing industries.
Grouping together the 10 European countries, ﬁgure 1 reports sectorial average R&D investment shares
for the US., Japan, and Europe. The ﬁgure shows that, while European countries as a whole kept a
fairly constant share, the U.S. share declined substantially, from 52 percent in 1973 to 37 percent in
1991, while Japan’s share increased from 17 percent in 1973 to 28 percent in 1991.10 This suggests
that the U.S. position as the global leader in R&D investment was increasingly challenged by Japanese
ﬁrms in the 1970s and 1980s.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 reports countries’ shares for each sector. The U.S. share is declining in many sectors
of the economy, but this decline is stronger in the most innovative sectors. With the exception of
Aircrafts and Drugs and Medicines, where global R&D shares are substantially constant or decline
slightly, we can observe that all other industries show a fairly large increase of Japan’s and, in some
cases, of Europe’s share at the expense of the U.S.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
High-tech and medium-high-tech industries, grouped according to the OECD classiﬁcation, rep-
resent 77 percent of total manufacturing R&D. In this group of industries, the larger drop in the
U.S. share takes place in Oﬃce and Computing Machineries (OCM),which accounts on average for
9See OECD ANBERD Rev.2, 2005.
10Similar results are obtained with the weighted average, where sectors’ share of total R&D are used as weights. The
U.S. weighted share, for instance, decreases from 57 percent in 1973 to 44 percent in 1991.
68 percent of total manufacturing R&D and in Radio, TV, and Communication Equipment (RTCE),
which accounts on average for 16 percent of total R&D: the U.S. share dropped from 0.76 to 0.53 in
OCM and from 0.54 to 0.4 in RTCE, while Japan’s share rose from 0.06 to 0.32 in OCM and from
0.13 to 0.26 in RTCE.
2.2 R&D subsidies
Next, I compute the R&D subsidy produced by tax policies in the U.S., Japan and some European
countries using Bloom, Griﬃth, and Van Reenen (2002)’s corporate tax data. The data take into
account the diﬀerent tax and tax credit systems used in each country, and measure the reduction
in the cost of 1$ of R&D investment produced by the tax system. The tax subsidy is the sum of
depreciation allowances for R&D investment and of tax credits speciﬁcally aimed at reducing the cost
of R&D. In all countries in the data there are depreciation allowances for R&D, and in most of the
countries R&D costs are fully expensed; that is, depreciation allowances imply a complete write-oﬀ of
R&D costs for tax purposes. Speciﬁc R&D tax credits, instead, are active in only a few countries.
The subsidy rate is computed as follows: let V be the before-tax present value of the marginal
investment in R&D, τπ be the corporate tax rate, Ad be depreciation allowances, and Ac be the speciﬁc
tax credit rate. Equalizing the marginal beneﬁts and costs of one additional unit of R&D investment,
we obtain
V (1 − τπ)=( 1− Ad − Ac).





The subsidy to R&D will be s = Ac
1−τπ, and will represent the reduction in the unit cost of research
produced by the tax system. This computation of the R&D subsidy follows the standard procedure
used in OECD (2005) to compare the generosity of tax treatment for R&D in diﬀerent countries. More
precisely, the standard tax subsidy is computed as 1−Bi n d e x ,w h e r eBi n d e x= 1−Ad−Ac
1−τπ ; assuming
Ad = τπ, it is easy to see that s =1− Bi n d e x . Figure 3 shows the subsidy rates s for diﬀerent
countries obtained using this procedure.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The diﬀerences among countries are mainly due to the presence and eﬀectiveness of a speciﬁct a x
credit for R&D. In fact, we can see that a jump in U.S. subsidies takes place with the introduction of
the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit on incremental R&D in 1981 and with the revision of
t h eb a s ed e ﬁning incremental R&D in 1990;11 and in Spain with the introduction of a tax credit for
all new ﬁxed assets in 1989. In Japan there is a ﬁxed tax credit of limited eﬀectiveness for the entire
11Only “incremental” R&D is eligible for the U.S. R&D tax credit: incremental meant above the level of the previous
year in 1981, and in the following years the increase was measured over the average R&D in the previous three years. In
1990 the base was deﬁned as the average of the last 3 years of the R&D-sales ratio.
7period considered. In the rest of the countries there are no special tax provisions or credits given on
R&D expenditures, and the positive and fairly constant subsidy rates are produced by tax credits
common to all assets.
Ak e yf e a t u r ee m e r g i n gf r o mﬁgure 3 is the increase in the U.S. R&D subsidy from 13 percent in 1979
to 30 percent in 1990. Recalling the evidence in ﬁgures 1 and 2 we can observe that this substantial
increase in public support for private innovation takes place in years when R&D investment from
foreign countries, especially from Japan, is challenging U.S. global leadership in research.
3 The model
In this section I set up the model and derive the steady-state equilibrium system of equations.
3.1 Households
Consider a two-country economy in which population, preferences, technologies, and institutions are
identical in both countries. Each household is endowed with a unit of labor time whose supply
generates no disutility. Dropping country indexes for notational simplicity, households are modelled




N0e−(ρ−n)t logu(t)dt,( 1 )


































Initial population is N0, and I normalize it to 1, while n is its constant growth rate; ρ i st h er a t eo f
time preference, with ρ>n . q(j,ω,t) is the per-member ﬂow of good ω,o fq u a l i t yj ∈ {0,1,2,...},
purchased by a household at time t ≥ 0. p(j,ω,t) is the price of good ω of quality j at time t.A
new vintage of a good ω yields a quality equal to λ times the quality of the previous vintage, with
λ>1.D i ﬀerent versions of the same good ω are regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes after
adjusting for their quality ratios, and jmax(ω,t) denotes the maximum quality in which the good ω
is available at time t. As is common in quality ladders models I will assume price competition at all
dates, which implies that in equilibrium only the top quality product is produced and consumed in
positive amounts. W(0) and Z(0) are the present discounted values of labor and non-labor income,
and T i sap e r - c a p i t al u m p - s u mt a x .
8Households solve the maximization problem in two stages. First, they choose the optimal allocation
of expenditures across the diﬀerent lines of product at a given moment t. Second, they choose the
optimal expenditure (consumption) path over time. The instantaneous utility function has unitary
elasticity of substitution between every pair of product lines. Thus, households maximize static utility
by spreading their expenditures c(t) evenly across the product line and by purchasing in each line only
the product with the lowest price per unit of quality, that is the product of quality j = jmax(ω,t).




for j = jmax(ω,t) and is zero otherwise. (2)




= r(t) − ρ (3)
3.2 Product market
In each country, ﬁrms can hire workers to produce any consumption good ω ∈ [0,1] under a constant
return-to-scale technology with one worker producing one unit of product. The wage rate is wK,
where K = D,F is the country indicator, domestic (D)a n df o r e i g n( F). However in each industry
the top quality product can be manufactured only by the ﬁrm that has discovered it, whose rights are
protected by a perfectly enforceable world-wide patent law. Due to the Arrow eﬀect, in each industry
only followers do R&D to discover the new top quality of a good.12 Successful innovators obtain the
market leadership and earn monopoly proﬁts; patents expire when further innovation occurs in the
industry.
I assume that technology is mobile, ﬁrms own the technology but can use it everywhere; it follows
that multinational companies are free to establish subsidiaries in low-wage countries to carry out the
manufacturing of their products, so in equilibrium labor prices will equalize. I choose the wage as
the numeraire, that is: wD = wF =1 . With this assumption the income eﬀects of international
competition are limited to proﬁts.13
The unit elastic demand structure encourages the monopolist to set the highest possible price to
maximize proﬁts, while the existence of a competitive fringe sets a ceiling equal to the world’s lowest
unit cost of the previous quality product. This allows us to conclude that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are maximized
through limit pricing, so the price pK (ω,t) of every top quality good is:
pK (ω,t)=λwK, for all ω ∈ [0,1], K = D,F,a n dt ≥ 0,( 4 )
where wK =1for K = D,F. From the static consumer demand (2), we can immediately conclude
12An incumbent considering investing in R&D needs to subtract its present monopoly poﬁts from the payoﬀ of successful
innovation. More precisely, the value to the incumbent of successful innovation is v(ω,t +1 )− v(ω,t), which is less the
value of innovation for the follower, v(ω,t +1 ) . For a recent novel interpretation of the Arrow eﬀect in quality ladder
models see Cozzi (2007).
13As I will discuss later, relaxing this assumption would increase the eﬀects of competition on national income and
strengthen the results in the paper.
9that the demand for each product ω is:
(cD(t)+cF(t))N(t)
λ
= q(ω,t),( 5 )
where cD(t) and cF(t) are domestic and foreign expenditures at time t. The above equation says that,
in equilibrium, the supply and demand of every consumption good coincides. Since wages and prices
are equal in both countries the stream of monopoly proﬁts accruing to the monopolist who produces
the state-of-the-art quality product in country K = D,F will be equal to
πK(ω,t)=π(ω,t)=q(ω,t)[p(ω,t) − 1] = (cD(t)+cF(t))N(t)(1− 1/λ) for all industries ω.( 6 )








where I(ω,t) denotes the worldwide Poisson arrival rate of an innovation that will destroy the mo-
nopolist’s proﬁts in industry ω. This is a no-arbitrage condition which states that the expected rate
of return of a stock issued by an R&D ﬁrm is equal to the riskless rate of return r(t).T h i s f o l l o w s
from the assumption that there are eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets channelling savings into R&D ﬁrms.
3.3 R&D races
In each industry, leaders are challenged by the R&D ﬁrms that employ workers and produce a probabil-
ity intensity of inventing the next version of their products. The arrival rate of innovation in industry
ω at time t is I(ω,t), which is the aggregate summation of the Poisson arrival rate of innovation
produced by all R&D ﬁrms targeting product ω.












where X(ω,t) > 0 measures the degree of complexity in the invention of the next quality product in
industry ω, α>0 represents a negative externality, LK(ω,t)=
P
i lK
i (ω,t) is the total labor used by
R&D ﬁrms, and IK(ω,t)=
P
i IK
i (ω,t) is the total investment in R&D (total arrival rate) in country
K. This technology implies that each ﬁrm’s instantaneous probability of success is a decreasing
function of the total domestic R&D investment in the industry. A possible interpretation of this
property is that when ﬁrms increase R&D in a sector, the probability of duplicative research eﬀorts
also increases, thereby reducing the probability that any single ﬁrm will discover the next vintage
of goods and appropriate the proﬁt rent associated with it. Therefore, the sector-speciﬁc negative
externality in research technology produces decreasing returns to scale (DRS) in R&D at the industry
level. Moreover, I assume that this negative externality is country-speciﬁc.14 The country-speciﬁc
14Eaton and Kortum (1999), Kortum (1993), and Jones and Williams (1998) provide empirical evidence on the existence
of DRS in R&D at the country level. I will discuss this more in details in the calibration exercise.
10nature of DRS in R&D could be motivated by the presence of some ﬁx e dc o s t ss u c ha sl a be q u i p m e n t ,
by institutional and/or cultural diﬀerences, and ﬁnally by a heterogeneous research ability of the
workforce.15
The technological complexity index X(ω,t) was introduced into endogenous growth theory af-
ter Jones’ (1995) found that the prediction of the ﬁrst generation R&D-driven growth models that
countries of diﬀerent size should show diﬀerent steady-state growth rates was not consistent with the
empirical evidence. This led to a second generation of models where diﬀerent speciﬁcations of X(ω,t)
were introduced to rule out scale-eﬀects. I will adopt a speciﬁcation introduced by Dinopoulos and
Thompson (1998), according to which X(ω,t)=2 κN(t), with positive κ, thereby formalizing the idea
that it is more diﬃcult to introduce a new product in a more crowded market. This speciﬁcation of
R&D technology allows you to remove the scale eﬀects and - at the same time - preserve a fundamen-
tal prediction of the ﬁrst generation models: policy measures have permanent eﬀects on the long-run
growth.
Governments subsidize R&D expenditures at the rate sK ﬁnanced with a lump-sum tax T.E a c h
R&D ﬁrm chooses lK
i in order to maximize its expected discounted proﬁts.16 Free entry into R&D








=( 1− sK).( 9 )














where I have substituted the proﬁt equation (6) into the equation for the value of the ﬁrm. This
condition, together with the Euler equation summarizes the utility-maximizing household choice of
consumption and savings, and the proﬁt-maximizing choice of manufacturing and R&D ﬁrms. Equa-
tion (10) has an immediate economic interpretation: the right hand side is the cost of producing one
unit of innovation I(ω,t),a n dt h el e f th a n ds i d ei st h eb e n e ﬁt of one unit of innovation, that is, the
discounted value of the monopolistic ﬁrm. Next, I introduce the concept of international competition
for innovation and specify the geographical structure of I(ω,t).
15While ﬁxed costs and institutional diﬀerence can motivate the country-speciﬁc R&D externality in the benchmark
model, the presence of heterogeneous workers require the removal of the assumption of global labor markets. In a similar
setup but with global labor markets Eaton and Kortum (1999) use the workers’ heterogeneity motivation of DRS in
R&D at the country level. As investment in research increases in a country, workers of lower ability will be used and
R&D productivity will decline.










i (1 − s
K).
113.4 International R&D competition
The scale of foreign competition in this model is determined by the measure of the set of sectors where
ﬁrms from both countries compete in R&D. Let ω ∈ (0,1) be the set of industries where domestic and
foreign researchers compete to discover the next vintage of products. Therefore the composition of
worldwide investment in innovation will be the following:
I(ω,t)=ID
c (ω,t)+IF(ω,t)=ID
c (t)+IF(t), for ω ≤ ω
I(ω,t)=ID
m(ω,t)=ID
m(t), for ω>ω (11)
X(ω,t)=2 κN(t) for all ω,
where κ>0, ID
c (ω,t) and ID
m(ω,t) are country D’s investment in R&D in the competitive and in
the non-competitive sectors respectively, and IF(ω,t) is the research investment of country F. The





m(t),I D(ω,t)=ID(t) for all ω ∈ (0,1). Finally, the R&D diﬃculty
index is proportional to the size of the global market, that is X(ω,t)=2 κN(t).
3.5 Steady-state equilibrium
Next, I derive the steady-state properties of the model, where per-capita endogenous variables are
stationary. To close the model I need to introduce the labor market clearing condition and the






X(t)/X(t)=n,f o rK = D, F, and using the Euler equation we ﬁnd that in steady state the interest
rate is equal to the intertemporal preference parameter, r(t)=ρ.
The unit cost of production for every good implies that the total production of goods in a country is
equal to the total labor used for manufacturing in that country. The total manufacturing labor is given
by the total labor supply minus the labor used in R&D. The presence of multinationals implies that





























where I have used X(ω,t)/N(t)=2 κ from the speciﬁcation of the R&D diﬃculty index.
The left-hand side represents the total demand for goods (labor), while the right hand side is
the total supply, given by total labor resources minus labor used in research. Finally, I consider the
resource constraint of the two countries: in each country total expenditures plus savings (investment
in R&D) must equal the national income - wages plus proﬁts (or interest income on assets).17
17In a similar two-country quality-ladders model Segerstrom and Lundborg (2002) do not treat R&D expenditures as
investment. They acknowledge that R&D should be treated as investment in national accounts but in reality, they claim,
this is not done. We instead include R&D investment in the national budget constraint. One implication of this is that
taxes levied to fund R&D subsidies cancel out in the constraint with the reduction in R&D costs due to the subsidies.


















































Notice that R&D investment is simply the wage bill of R&D workers and that each country
appropriates the monopoly rent in the subset of industries where that country is the world leader. It
is also worth noticing that I am assuming complete “home-bias” in asset ownership, in the sense that
domestic ﬁrms are owned completely domestically and foreign ﬁrms are completely foreign-owned.18
The international division of research labor speciﬁed in the previous section leads to the following
































c + IF − n


















where, using the R&D technology (8) we have expressed research labor as a function of the innovation





. The labor market clearing
condition (12), turns out to be the sum of the two resource constraints (13) and (14), so the three
equations are not linearly independent; I can omit one of them, and solve for the three equations in
(15), and the remaining (13), (14).
Before solving the equilibrium systems and deriving the main conclusions I will complete the
description of the model by showing the expressions for welfare. Substituting the steady state instan-
taneous utility of the household problem (1) into the discounted utility, I obtain discounted welfare
indicators for both countries:







where gK i st h eg r o w t hr a t ei nc o u n t r yK. In the present framework with quality-improving goods,
growth is interpreted as the increase over time of the representative consumer utility level, hence the
symmetric growth rate is obtainable from (1) as follows:
18This assumption is supported by empirical evidence on home-bias in asset ownership. French and Poterba (1991)
and Tesar and Werner (1995) estimated the percentage of aggregate stock market wealth invested in domestic equities
at the beginning of the 1990s to be well above 90% in the U.S. and Japan and around 80% in the UK and Germany. I
have also performed the quantitative exercises in the next sections with partial home biases calibrated at 90 and 95%
















0 I(ω,τ)dτ is the expected number of innovations in industry ω before time t.
In a world with perfect international knowledge spillovers, R&D performed in one country would
have the same impact on the growth rate of both countries, and the growth rate will be the same
in the two economies. Considering the symmetric structure of the model, the distribution of R&D











m. The growth rate is obtained by diﬀerentiating


















In this growth equation, international knowledge spillovers are assumed to be perfect, thus gD =
gF = g in (17). Eaton and Kortum (1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire (2005) ﬁnd evidence
that international spillovers of ideas are high but not perfect. For a representative set of OECD
countries, Eaton and Kortum show that countries adopt one-half to three-fourths of the ideas generated











for the domestic country, and
gF =2
©
γFωIF +( 1− γF)
£
ωID




for the foreign country, where γK represent the impact on national growth of innovation performed in
nation K.W h e nγD = γF =0 .5, international spillovers are perfect and the symmetric growth rate
is that in (17), otherwise the growth rates will be (18) and (19). In the following sections I will start
from the simple speciﬁcation of the growth equation in (17) to derive analytically the two main eﬀects
of competition. In the quantitative analysis, following the suggestion of the empirical evidence, I will
assume imperfect international knowledge spillovers and use (18) and (19).
4 The growth and business-stealing eﬀect of competition on welfare
In this section I characterize analytically the two basic eﬀects of foreign competition on the domestic
welfare, the business-stealing and the growth eﬀect, and explain the economic mechanism behind
them. I begin analyzing the growth eﬀect. Equations (15) imply that innovation intensity is the same
in both countries in competitive sectors, that is ID
c = IF; as mentioned above, this is a consequence
of the basic symmetry of the two countries in those sectors. Let ID
c = IF = Ic and substitute into
(15), (13), (14) to obtain a system in four equations and four unknowns, Ic,ID
m,c D,c F. Summing up
the new versions of (13) and (14), solving for
¡
cD + cF¢
and substituting into the new version of (15)




















































shown in ﬁgure 4, the two curves intersect only once, thus a steady state equilibrium for ID
m and Ic
is uniquely determined. These equilibrium values can be substituted back into (15) to obtain the
balanced growth path of cD and cF.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
I now turn to analyze the eﬀects of increases in foreign competition on lung-run growth. Proposition
2 below summarizes the results:
Proposition 1 Increases in foreign competition have two counteracting eﬀects on the steady state
growth rate:
i. The increase in the number of competitive sectors raises global R&D eﬃciency, thus beneﬁting
growth. This is the ‘eﬃciency’ eﬀect of competition.
ii. Innovation arrival rates per-sector decrease, thereby slowing down growth. This is the ‘obsoles-
cence’ eﬀect.
iii. The ‘eﬃciency’ eﬀect is dominant and competition has a positive overall eﬀect on growth
Proof. See appendix.
The eﬃciency eﬀect is produced by the R&D externality α in (8). As R&D is characterized by
a negative country-speciﬁc externality, the competitive sectors, where R&D is performed by domestic
and foreign ﬁrms, can accommodate a larger global investment in R&D. The country-level concavity
of the R&D technology implies that in each industry, two researchers from two diﬀerent countries
are more productive than two researchers from the same country. Thus, a higher ω leads to a larger
number of sectors with higher arrival rate of innovation and, consequently, to higher long-run growth.
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(20)
T h es o u r c eo ft h eeﬃciency eﬀect is the diﬀerence between innovation intensity in competitive and
non-competitive sectors. This eﬀect can be oﬀset by a negative impact of competition on the sectorial
levels of innovation Ic and ID
m. A sw ec a ns e ei nﬁgure 4, an increase in ω, on the one hand, raises
15the intercept of II(ω), thus raising both investments levels but, on the other hand, increases the slope
of II(ω), thus reducing Ic and ID
m. If the latter force dominates, there will be a negative eﬀect of
competition on R&D investment per-sector that could oﬀset the positive eﬃciency eﬀect. This the
case drawn in ﬁgure 4 and, in fact, as shown in the appendix it is possible to prove that ∂Ic/∂ω and
∂ID
m/∂ω are always negative. Intuitively, foreign R&D presence in more sectors raises, in equilibrium,
the obsolescence of innovation, thus reducing the incentives to innovate - this is the obsolescence eﬀect.
In the appendix I show that the obsolescence eﬀect cannot completely oﬀset the positive eﬃciency
eﬀect, which implies that the overall growth eﬀect (GRE) of competition is positive.19 Since growth
increases welfare through improvements of goods’ quality, we can conclude that competition has a
positive eﬀect on welfare through the growth channel.
Next, I analyze the eﬀect of competition on national income. As foreign R&D ﬁrms enter some
industries previously dominated by domestic ﬁrms, with a probability proportional to their research
eﬀort they will discover the next top-quality good and obtain global market leadership. This business-
stealing eﬀect (BSE) reduces domestic aggregate proﬁts because foreign ﬁrms appropriate a bigger
share of the world market. Since, by assumption, the labor market is not aﬀected by shifts in the
global ownership distribution of ﬁrms, only the proﬁt component of domestic income will decreases.
This leads to:
Proposition 2 An increase in the scale of foreign R&D competition ω shifts domestic proﬁts abroad,
thus reducing domestic income.
Proof. See appendix.
Considering the expression for the domestic resource constraint (13), it is easy to see that a
reduction in income, right hand side of (13), can lead to a reduction in domestic consumption, and
thus to a decline in national welfare (16) if domestic savings - R&D spending - do not absorb the whole
reduction in income. Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain an analytical proof of the eﬀect of
foreign business-stealing on domestic welfare.20 Moreover, if proﬁt-stealing aﬀects negatively domestic
welfare, which is what one would expect, the overall eﬀect of competition on welfare would depend on
the relative strength of the two counteracting eﬀects - the BSE and the GRE. Hence, a quantitative
measure of the two eﬀects is needed. For this reason I will now calibrate the model and explore its
full properties numerically.
5 Taking the model to the data
The analysis proceeds in three steps: ﬁrst, I adapt the data discussed in section 2 to the model economy.
More precisely, in this section I ﬁrst build an indicator that embeds the deﬁnition of competition used
in the model; that is, I construct a measure of ω, the share of industries where domestic and foreign
19In the numerical solution, we will see that the negative eﬀect of competition on Ic and I
D
m is substantially of second
order.
20At the roots of the reduced tractability of the model is the assumption of non-linear R&D technology. Once the
non-linearity in (8) is removed, by setting α =0 , it is easy to prove that the BSE has a negative impact on domestic
welfare. This result is available upon request from the author.
16countries eﬀectively compete for innovation. Secondly, I adapt the R&D subsidy computed above
to the speciﬁc form of subsidy adopted in the model. Thirdly, I use these data and other long-run
statistics to calibrate the parameters of the model.
5.1 R&D subsidies
The mapping between the subsidy rates shown in ﬁgure 3 and the R&D subsidy in the model is as
follows: consider the following version of the free entry condition (9),
V (1 − τπ)=( 1− Ad − Ac),
where V = vK(ω,t)(A/X(ω,t))
¡
LK(ω,t)/X(ω,t)
¢−α, is the before-tax present value of the marginal
investment and, as before, τπ is the corporate tax rate, Ad is depreciation allowances, and Ac is the
speciﬁc tax credit rate. Assuming full expensing, that is Ad = τπ, and rearranging we obtain again
V =1− Ac/(1 − τπ), and setting s = Ac/(1 − τπ) we obtain exactly the free entry condition in the
model. This synthetic measure of tax subsidies has the drawback of not allowing for the distinction
between depreciation allowances and tax credit. A more relevant problem with the measure is that
it includes both the eﬀects of changes in corporate tax rates and in the R&D tax credit.21 In order
to deal with both issues, I use s = Ac as the subsidy rate, thus accounting only for the presence
and eﬀectiveness of R&D tax credits.22 Figure 5 below reports the R&D subsidy obtained from this
calculation.
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3 and 5 are substantially similar except for the fact that subsidies are lower for all countries
when the measure is cleaned of the eﬀects of changes in depreciation allowances and corporate taxes.
In particular the U.S. subsidy increases from 6 percent in 1979 to 18 percent in 1991.
5.2 Measuring the set of competitive industries
The measure of R&D competition is built using the OECD ANBERD data on R&D investment
mentioned above. The U.S. is assumed to be the domestic (leading) country; Japan and Europe,
are the foreign (follower) countries. The index is based on the following criterion: for each year, in
the period 1973-91, I consider a sector competitive if the U.S. share of total R&D investment in that
sector is smaller than a competitive threshold (CT henceforth). The industries set is composed of 21
two and three-digits manufacturing industries, and the competitive set of industries ω is the share of
sectors with U.S. R&D investment share below CT. The share is computed for diﬀerent threshold
values in the plausible set CT ∈ (0.35,0.55),a n dt h eﬁnal index is chosen taking the average across
thresholds.23
21This is also problematic because in the model there are no corporate taxes.
22For the U.S. this leads to subsidy levels close to those estimated in Hall (1993), who isolated the eﬀect of the R&D
tax credit on the cost of innovation.
23This is the interesting range to study because from ﬁgure 1 we see that the average US R&D share is never above
0.55 and below 0.35.T h i si sa l s oc o n ﬁrmed by ﬁgure 2 where we can see very few sectors with a US share outside that
range.
17[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 6 shows the measure for ω obtained using the bottom threshold CT =0 .35 and the top
threshold CT =0 .55; it also shows the average ω, which is computed taking the mean of all the
ωs obtained at each threshold levels in the set CT ∈ (0.35,0.55). All measures show an increasing
trend; the average ω, which will be used in the calibration exercise, increases from 0.3 - 30 percent
of the sectors are competitive - in 1973 to 0.68 in 1991. Using the average index allows me to deal
with the problem of sensitivity to small changes that ﬁxing one speciﬁc threshold might produce. For
instance, suppose that I arbitrarily choose the threshold CT =0 .5, and in an industry the U.S. share
is 0.51 in one year and 0.49 the next year, this small change will be enough to shift the industry from
non-competitive to competitive in the index. Taking the average ω across thresholds allows me to
avoid the problem of small changes making big diﬀerences in the index.
5.3 Calibration
In this section I calibrate the parameters of the model to match some basic long-run empirical regular-
ities for the U.S. economy. I then compute the numerical solution using the calibrated parameters and
show the model’s ﬁt with the data. I need to calibrate 7 parameters. Five of them, ρ, λ, n, γD and
α will be calibrated using benchmarks that are standard in the growth literature, while the others, A
and k, will be calibrated internally so that the model’s steady-state matches salient facts of the U.S.
economy.
Parameters calibrated “externally”- Some parameters of the model have close counterparts
in real economies so that their calibration is straightforward. I set ρ, which in the steady-state is equal
to the interest rate r,t o0.05, slightly below the average real return on the stock market for the past
century of 0.07 estimated in Mehra and Prescott (2003).24 Is e tλ to 1.2, to match an average markup
over the marginal cost of 20 per cent. Since, estimates of average sectorial mark-up are in the interval
(0.1,0.4) (Basu 1996), I take an intermediate value in this range. I calibrate n to match the population
growth rate of 1.14%, which is the average business sector labor force growth rate in the period 1948-97
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1999). Decreasing returns due to duplicative R&D at the country level
have been estimated to be between 0.4 and 0.9 (Kortum 1993, and Jones and Williams, 1998, Eaton
and Kortum, 1999).25 I choose a value in this interval and set the R&D externality coeﬃcient α to
24Jones and Williams (2000) suggest that the interest rate in R&D-driven growth models is also the equilibrium rate
of return to R&D, and so it cannot be simply calibrated to the risk-free rate on treasury bills - which is around 1%.
They in fact calibrate their R&D-driven growth model with interest rates ranging from 0.04 to 0.14.
25Empirical estimates of decreasing returns in R&D are usually obtained using a speciﬁcation of the R&D technology
diﬀerent from the one in this paper. The general form for the technology used is , I = AL
β
R,w h e r eI is the innovation
intensity and LR are resources invested in research, and 0 <β<1. Estimates for β suggest values between 0.1 and 0.6
(e.g. Kortum,1993, Jones and Williams,1998, and Eaton and Kortum,1999). Since all sectors in my model are symmetric,








Thus, estimates of β in the interval (0.1,0.6) using the general technology above, roughly traslate in values for α in
the interval (0.4,0.9) with my speciﬁcation of the R&D technology. It follows that α =0 .4 is the lower bound of the
empirical estimates; this is a conservative choice in that it allows the benchmark model to be as close as possible to the
textbook case of linear technology. In the robustness analysis i will explore an exaustive set of values for α.
180.4. Finally. motivated by the empirical evidence discussed above I focus on a world with imperfect
knowledge spillovers. Eaton and Kortum (1999) decompose the geographical sources of R&D-driven
growth and ﬁnd that about 60 percent of U.S. growth comes from domestic research and the rest from
research performed abroad. Hence, I set the international knowledge spillovers parameter for the U.S.
γD at 0.6.
Parameters calibrated “internally”-Is i m u l t a n e o u s l yc h o o s eA and κ so that the numerical
steady-state solution of the model matches a set of long-run stylized facts. Since the paper’s focus
is on R&D investment, it seems natural to use data from Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2006, CHS
henceforth), where U.S. national account data have been revised to introduce investment in intangible
capital, including R&D. Moreover, since there is no tangible capital in the model, all statistics used in
the calibration need to be adapted to the model economy. More precisely, the two statistics targeted
in the calibration of A and κ, which will be the growth rate of labor productivity and the R&D ratio to
GDP, are obtained by subtracting investment in tangible capital from the data. After this adjustment
the CHS data report an average growth in labor productivity of 1.9% a year in the period 1975-2003.
Since in the model all investment is in R&D, the targeted statistics for the R&D ratio to GDP would
be the investment in intangible capital share of total income; after subtracting tangible capital this
leads to an average of 13.5% over the period 1975-2003. Finally, in the internal calibration I have set
the two subsidies at their 1979 values, that is sD = sF =0 .06: this is the earliest value available for
the measure of R&D subsidy computed in the previous section and shown in ﬁgure 5. I have also used
the 1979 value for international competition shown in ﬁgure 6 above, that is I have set ω =0 .42.26
The parameters calibrated internally have been found by minimizing the quadratic distance be-
tween the model and two long-run statistics listed above: the resulting values are A =0 .46 and
κ =0 .92.
[TABLE I ABOUT HERE]
T a b l eIs h o w sh o ww e l lt h em o d e lﬁts the U.S. data at the initial date, 1979. The calibrated model
ﬁts the targeted and some relevant non-targeted statistics closely enough.
6 Quantitative analysis
In this section I use the calibrated parameters to explore the quantitative properties of the model.
First, I measure the relative strength of the growth and business-stealing eﬀects of competition on
welfare. Second, I numerically compute the optimal domestic subsidy and analyze the eﬀects of foreign
competition on its level.
6.1 Foreign competition and welfare
Figure 7 shows the eﬀects of an increase in the share of competitive industries ω.T h e n u m e r i c a l
simulation allows us to quantify the analytical results derived above. First, when foreign researchers
26Although data for all relevant variables are available from 1973, multi-country data on R&D subsidies start at 1979.
Hence I point my calibration at that period.
19enter sectors in which previously only domestic ﬁrms were active, some of the monopolistic rents of
domestic leaders shift abroad, and domestic income and welfare are negatively aﬀected. This is the
business-stealing eﬀect (BSE) of foreign entry.
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Second, the growth eﬀect (GRE) of competition is positive; more precisely, more precisely increas-
ing ω from 0 to 1 raises domestic growth from 1.65 to 1.88 percent. Thirdly, the welfare eﬀect of
competition depends on the relative strength of the BSE and the GRE.A sw ec a ns e ei nﬁgure 7,
when competition rises from ω =0to ω =1 , domestic income decreases by 14.7 percent and domestic
growth rises by 12.8 percent. The GRE counterbalances the negative BSE but not completely, and
the overall eﬀect of competition on welfare is negative; more precisely increasing ω from 0 to 1 reduces
domestic welfare, measured in terms of quality-adjusted per-capita consumption, by 3.2 percent.
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 8 also shows the robustness of the BSE, the GRE, and their impact on welfare to changes
in the speciﬁcation of parameters. Precisely it shows how the results are aﬀected by doubling and
halving, one at the time, the parameters from their baseline calibration values.27 There are three
things to notice: ﬁrst, the BSE is strongly robust to changes in parameters, and its scale is mainly
aﬀected by changes in the proﬁt rate pinned down by the markup λ − 1.
Second, the growth eﬀect (GRE) of competition crucially depends on the value of the externality
α, and on the level of international knowledge spillovers for the domestic country γD.W h e n α is
low, and/or γD is high, the GRE can also be negative. This happens because in the quantitative
analysis I assumed imperfect international knowledge spillovers. When γD and γF are diﬀerent from
0.5, the growth rate is not symmetric across countries anymore, and the spillovers of past on future
research diﬀer according to the location of past research. Proposition 1 shows that in the symmetric
world, where γD = γF =0 .5,t h eg r o w t he ﬀect of competition is always positive, independently of the
speciﬁcation of parameters. Repeating the proof of proposition 1 for γD diﬀerent from 0.5 it is easy
to show that a necessary condition for competition to have a positive eﬀect on growth is γD ≤ 0.5.
In the quantitative analysis, the domestic country is the U.S. and, following estimates in Eaton and
Kortum (1999), 60 percent of U.S. growth comes from domestic sources. Thus, with the benchmark
γD set at 0.6, foreign competition has a smaller eﬃciency eﬀect on domestic growth because R&D
spillovers are mainly domestic. It follows that the growth eﬀect of competition becomes sensitive to
changes in α. At low levels of α, the reduction ID
c and ID
m produced by competition - the obsolescence
eﬀect - dominates the eﬃciency eﬀect, and the GRE becomes negative. In the ﬁgure we can see that
for α =0 .2 and/or for γD =0 .8 the GRE becomes negative. More precisely, repeating the sensitivity
analysis for a thinner grid of α and γD,Iﬁnd that the GRE is negative for α ≤ 0.22 and for γD ≥ 0.68.
27For brevity I only report the sensitivity analysis for parameters producing more interesting changes. The robustness
for the whole set of parameters is available upon request. Notice that, in those cases where doubling is not possible,
because the parameters space is in (0,1), I have increased them by a substantial amount.
20Since empirical estimates suggest that the relevant interval for α is (0.4,0.9),a n df o rγD not above 0.6
(see Eaton and Kortum, 1999), we can conclude that in the space of plausible αsa n dγDst h eGRE
is positive.
The third important feature emerging from the robustness analysis is that there is only one case
where the overall eﬀect of competition on welfare is positive, that is when the discount factor (interest
rate) is below 3 percent - in the ﬁgure we report the simulation for ρ =0 .025. Intuitively, when con-
sumers are more patient, the welfare eﬀect of quality-improving innovation is higher and it completely
oﬀsets the negative BSE. Mehra and Prescott (2005) show that the average returns on stocks in the
past century never go below 0.07 for the U.S., and below 0.047 other OECD countries in their sample.
It follows that in the plausible set of ρst h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect of competition is negative.
6.2 Foreign competition and optimal R&D subsidies
Next, I use the calibrated model to compute the eﬀect of foreign competition on the optimal domestic
subsidy. Since I am interested in studying the eﬀect of foreign competition on the domestic subsidy, I
keep the foreign subsidy ﬁxed at its average value in the period of analysis, that is sF =0 .68.28 The
timing of the subsidy game is the following: I assume that at stage 1, the domestic government sets
the subsidy; at stage 2 R&D and manufacturing ﬁrms choose their proﬁt-maximizing level of activity,
and households choose their utility-maximizing consumption bundles and assets holdings. For each
level of competition and for a given level of the foreign subsidy, the domestic policy maker sets the






Figure 9 below shows that higher foreign competition increases the optimal domestic R&D subsidy.29
[FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]
To grasp the economic mechanism behind this result we need to understand how changes in com-
petition aﬀect the marginal eﬀects of subsidies on national welfare. For this purpose it is convenient
to rewrite the present value of national welfare (16) in the following form:






= GK + Y K − RK, for K = D,F, (22)
where the G equals the present value of the growth rate, GK = gK/(ρ − n); using the national budget
(resource) constraints, consumption is rewritten as national income Y K - wages wK plus total proﬁts
ΠK =
R 1
0 πK(ω,t)dω - minus savings - investment in R&D RK = wK R 1
0 IK(ω,t)dω).30
In quality ladder models of closed economies, innovation has three external eﬀects aﬀecting the
l e v e lo ft h eo p t i m a ls u b s i d y : aconsumer-surplus or growth eﬀect (GR), a business-stealing eﬀect
28In Impullitti (2006) I consider the strategic policy game with both countries active in R&D subsidies and responding
optimally to changes in competition. The qualitative results are not aﬀected.
29The calibration has been pointed to 1979, therefore the starting level of competition is the 1979 level, ω =0 .42.
30All values for the new expression for consumption are in logs. The expressions in extensive form for wages, proﬁts,
and R&D expenditures for both countries can be found in (13) and (14 ).
21(BSE), and a resource constraint eﬀect (RCE). First, the GRE has two diﬀerent components: the
direct consumer surplus eﬀect and the intertemporal spillover eﬀect. Consumers beneﬁtf r o mah i g h e r -
quality product when it is introduced by the current innovator; this is the direct eﬀect. They also
beneﬁt from the new good after it has been replaced by the next innovators who build on the previous
quality ladder, this is the intertemporal eﬀect. Since R&D ﬁrms do not take these eﬀects on consumer
surplus into account, they produce underinvestment in innovation.
Secondly, every time a ﬁrm innovates it drives another ﬁrm out of business; the appropriation
of the incumbent ﬁrm’s monopoly proﬁts reduces aggregate proﬁts and consumption, thus having a
negative eﬀect on welfare. This is the BSE and in (22) it aﬀects ΠD, the per-capita aggregate real
proﬁts of the innovating country. This eﬀect is external to the decision of the innovating ﬁrm, thus it
leads to overinvestment in R&D.
Finally, because of the externality represented by α in the technology (8), R&D investment by
an a t i o n a lﬁrm increases the sectorial level of research and reduces the productivity of future ﬁrms
investing in that industry in that country. This is the RCE and has the following components: ﬁrst,
more resources must be allocated to R&D in order to maintain the steady-state level of innovation, this
makes fewer resources available for consumption. Second, as consumption is reduced, incumbent ﬁrms’
proﬁts in all sectors will also be reduced, resulting in even lower consumption. Since R&D ﬁrms do
n o tt a k et h i se ﬀects into account, they produce another bias toward overinvestment. Both components
aﬀect welfare through the resource constraint: in the metric of the utility function in (22) they aﬀect
RD =l n ( LD/λ), total labor resources allocated to R&D, and the total proﬁt ΠD respectively.31 Using



























where the plus and minus signs signal that the external eﬀect leads respectively to underinvestment,
thereby motivating R&D subsidies, and overinvestment, thereby motivating R&D taxes.
As shown in Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom (1998), in closed economies the policy
maker sets the optimal subsidy balancing at the margin these three eﬀects. Whether it is optimal
to tax or subsidize R&D generally depends on the speciﬁcation of parameters. In closed economy
models policy intervention is only motivated by the presence of knowledge spillovers,w h i c hi sa tt h e
roots of the three external eﬀects discussed above. The novelty introduced by my two-country version
of the model is that of adding a strategic motive for subsidies: in sectors where foreign followers
drive domestic incumbent out of the market, proﬁts shift abroad and domestic income and welfare
are reduced. I call this the international business-stealing eﬀect (IBSE) which in our utility metric
(22) works on ΠD.S i n c e h o m e R & D ﬁrms do not take this eﬀect into account when innovating, a
bias toward underinvestment is produced. Intuitively the presence of foreign innovator produces an
additional role for subsidies, that of protecting domestic proﬁts.
31I nt h el i t e r a t u r et h i se ﬀect is sometimes called the intertemporal R&D spillovers eﬀect because it depends on the
impact of current innovation on future R&D productivity (see e.g. Segerstrom, 1998).
22The main force driving the results in ﬁgure 9 is the strategic motive for subsidies: as international
R&D rivalry rises, the foreign rent-stealing threat becomes more relevant and triggers higher domestic
subsidies. It is possible to see in equation (13) that the domestic policy maker has no rents to protect
at ω =0 ,w h i l et or o l eo fsD in protecting domestic rents raises with the share of sectors exposed to
international R&D competition. Hence, an higher ω implies an higher scale of foreign business-stealing
and a higher role of the domestic subsidy as a rent-protecting device.
The country-speciﬁc negative R&D externality in (8) implies that competition also aﬀects the
knowledge spillovers motive for subsidies. By increasing the productivity of domestic R&D, com-
petition improves both the RCE and the GRE of home subsidies. The country-level concavity of
the R&D technology implies that research eﬃciency increases in newly-competitive sectors. Since this
eﬀect is external to the ﬁrm, the single domestic investor does not take it into account, thus under-
sinvestment in research emerges. This channel works directly through the growth eﬀect of subsidies
(GRE). Similarly, an increase in the number of competitive sectors raises the aggregate productivity
of domestic research labor, and reduces the labor resources required to maintain the steady-state level
of innovation. This reduces the overinvestment in innovation produced by the RCE. It follows that
increasing competition raises the growth eﬀect of subsidies and reduces the overinvestment due to the
RCE. We can thus conclude that competition raises the domestic subsidy also via the knowledge
spillovers channel.
6.3 Robustness
Figure 9 shows an extensive robustness analysis of the eﬀect of competition on the optimal subsidy.
Precisely it shows how the results are aﬀected by doubling and halving, one at the time, the parameters
λ, α, ρ, A, κ, n, γD from their baseline calibration values. The basic qualitative result is conﬁrmed un-
der all parameters’ changes: increases in foreign competition raise the optimal domestic subsidy.32 Two
features deserve special attention. First, the eﬀect of changes in parameters on the level of the optimal
subsidy is in line with standard results in the literature. As in Segerstrom (1998), the optimal subsidy
is higher with higher λ, γD, n, and lower with higher ρ. These, changes can be explained using (23).









it is easy to see that the growth, or consumers surplus, motive for subsidy GD increases when quality
jumps are larger (high λ), consumers are less impatient (small ρ), there are more future consumers
beneﬁting from the current innovation (large n), and when there are lower international knowledge
spillovers (high γD).
Technology parameters A, κ,a n dα,a ﬀect the resource constraint eﬀect, RCE, in (23). Larger
A implies higher productivity of R&D labor and lower resources must be devoted to research to
32This sensitivity analysis is only meant to show that eﬀects of a change in each parameters on the qualitative results;
but on the quantitative side, the eﬀects shown here are not reliable. This is due to the fact that, parameters A and κ
have been calibrated internally and, as a consequence, changes in each of the externally calibrated parameters would
involve a re-calibration of A and κ. Thus, the standard procedure for robustness of changing one parameter at the time,
without re-calibrating A and κ,a ﬀects the ﬁt of the model obtained in table I and it may yield implausible levels of
the optimal subsidy. For brevity and since I am only interested in showing that the positive eﬀect of competition on
subsidies is robust, I do not recalibrate the internal parameters. Moreover, this procedure allows me to single out the
qualitative eﬀect of each parameter; while recalibrating A and κ any time one of the externally calibrated parameter
changes would make the eﬀect of each parameter harder to isolate.
23maintain the steady state growth rate; this reduces the RCE of the marginal innovation and raises
s∗D. Parameters κ and α aﬀect the RCE similarly but in the opposite direction: larger values imply
smaller s∗D. Segertrom (1998) ﬁnds similar results for his technology parameters but in his paper
the R&D technology is linear. Jones and Williams (2000), using a R&D technology with decreasing
returns, show that the degree of decreasing returns is positively associated with higher overinvestment
in research with respect to the social optimum. Correspondingly, in my model, when decreasing returns
in R&D are strong - high α - the optimal subsidy becomes negative. Finally, notice that the positive
relation between competition and subsidy is conﬁrmed also in those cases where the speciﬁcation of
parameters leads to negative optimal R&D subsidies. In these cases increases in competition reduce
the optimal R&D tax.
7 Foreign competition, welfare, and R&D subsidies in the U.S.
In this ﬁnal section I apply the calibrated model to, ﬁrst, quantify the welfare eﬀect of the increase in
f o r e i g nR & Dc o m p e t i t i o no b s e r v e di nt h ed a t as h o w ni nﬁgure 6, keeping constant the R&D subsidies
in both countries. Secondly, I quantify the welfare gains obtainable if the domestic country, the U.S.,
had implemented an optimal R&D subsidy response to the observed increase in foreign competition
in the period 1979-91. I compare the domestic welfare under optimal subsidies with that under the
actual subsidies observed in the data, for each level of international competition.33
In ﬁgure 6 we can see that international R&D competition increases from ω =0 .42 in 1979 to
ω =0 .68 in 1991. In the numerical results shown in ﬁgure 8, this change in competition produces an
increase in the U.S. growth rate of 3.1 p e r c e n ta n dad e c r e a s ei nU . S .i n c o m eo f3.6 percent. These
two eﬀects combine to an overall reduction in U.S. welfare of 0.8 percent of quality-adjusted per-
capita consumption. Thus, as we mentioned above, although the positive growth eﬀect of competition
does not completely oﬀset the BSE, it limits the negative overall eﬀect of competition on welfare
substantially.
Next, I compute the diﬀerence between to optimal and the observed subsidy in the period 1979-
1991 and its welfare implications. The welfare improvement is obtained considering the following









































+l n ( 1+β),
choosing β such that c WD = W∗D,w h e r eW∗D(s∗D,ωobs) is the present value of welfare under the op-





is the equilibrium allocation under the observed levels of competition and subsidies. Thus, β is the
welfare gain associated with the optimal subsidy, measured in terms of “equivalent compensating
variation” of per-capita lifetime consumption. Table II below reports the welfare gains β.
33Unfortunately, the lack of subsidy data imposes a restriction of the focus to the period 1979-91, and the period of
major increase in competition, 1973-79, cannot be analyzed.
24[TABLE II ABOUT HERE]
Surprisingly, in the benchmark economy the optimal subsidy turns out to be close to the subsidy
in the data and, consequently, the welfare gains brought about by the optimal policy are very low: an
increase in competition from its 1979 level, ω =0 .42, to its 1991 level, ω =0 .68, leads to a welfare
gain from the optimal subsidy of at most 0.04 percent of quality-adjusted per-capita consumption
per-year. This result has been obtained with a benchmark calibration showing a suﬃciently good ﬁt
of the model with the data shown in table I.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I have shown that increases in international technological competition, measured as the
number of industries in which domestic and foreign innovators eﬀectively compete for global leadership,
have two counteracting eﬀects on domestic welfare: a business-stealing eﬀect that reduces domestic
proﬁts and income, thus aﬀecting welfare negatively; and a growth eﬀect produced by the increase in
the eﬃciency of R&D, brought about by foreign entry, which raises welfare. The overall welfare eﬀect
is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two counteracting eﬀects.
Although these two eﬀects have opposite implications for national welfare, they work in the same
direction on the core external eﬀects determining the optimal domestic R&D subsidy. More precisely,
on the one hand, competition, by increasing the scale of international business-stealing, raises the
strategic role of subsidies. On the other hand, the increase in R&D eﬃciency produced by foreign
entry raises the growth or knowledge spillovers motive for subsidies. As a consequence, increases in
foreign competition lead to higher optimal domestic R&D subsidies.
Using R&D investment data at the sectorial level for a relevant set of countries I have constructed
an index of international R&D competition that matches the dimension of technological competition
analyzed in the model. In other words, I have built a measure of the share of sectors where domestic
and foreign ﬁrms are neck-and-neck in R&D investment. This empirical measure shows that U.S.
global leadership was increasingly challenged by foreign competition in 1970s and 1980s. Using this
measure in a calibrated version of the model, and focusing on the period 1979-91, I perform a quanti-
tative analysis that leads to two main results: ﬁrst, the growth and business-stealing eﬀect of foreign
competition on U.S. welfare substantially balance each other, thus leading to a negligible welfare loss
of less then 1 percent of U.S. per-capita consumption in the 12-year period. Secondly, using R&D sub-
sidies data from Bloom et al. (2002) I have compared the optimal U.S. R&D subsidy with the subsidy
observed in the data during this period of rapidly increasing foreign competition. The results show
that the observed U.S. subsidy is surprisingly close to the optimal subsidy response to competition
produced by the model.
There are two important aspect that have not been considered in this paper: ﬁrst the eﬀect
of foreign competition on domestic wages, and second, the strategic complementarity between the
domestic and foreign subsidy. The impact of international business-stealing on domestic income has
been limited to the shift of proﬁts abroad. Removing the simplifying assumption of perfectly global
labor markets will increase the income losses associated with competition. The wage-stealing eﬀect
25that would be observed in an economy where labor markets are partially local, would represent an
additional channel through which competition, on the one hand, aﬀects domestic welfare negatively
and, on the other hand, strengthens the strategic motive for subsidies. Consequently, we could expect a
larger eﬀect of competition on the optimal subsidy and, in the quantitative analysis, a more substantial
distance between this and the observed U.S. subsidy.34 Finally, solving for the full Nash subsidy game,
where both domestic and foreign governments respond optimally to changes in competition, would




The comparative statics stated in proposition 2 can be derived analytically solving the equilibrium




. In order to do this we consider the reduced



















































from (26) into the other two equations we obtain (I) and (II) shown in the





where Φ1,Φ2 are the derivatives of (I) w.r.t. Ic and ID
m respectively, and Φ3, Φ4, Φ5, are the derivatives
of (II) w.r.t. Ic, ID

















Since the Φj > 0 for j =1 ,2,3,4, Cramer’s rule allows us to conclude that
34This channel, limited to the eﬀect of competition on domestic welfare, h a sb e e ne x p l o r e di nI m p u l l i t t i( 2 0 0 7 ) .





















































where I have used (II) to obtain the second equality. The eﬀect of competition on Ic and ID
m is zero
only if Φ5 =0 , which happens iﬀ ID










1 − α ¡
ρ +2 1−αIc − n
¢
(ρ − n)=2 α (ρ − n),
and since ρ>nwe ﬁnd Φ5 =0only for α =0 ,w h i l eΦ5 < 0 otherwise and, consequently, dIc/dω,
dID
m/dω<0 for α>0. This proves the second part of proposition 1. Moreover, it conﬁrms the result
analytically obtained in proposition 1 that when α =0 , dIc/dω, dID
m/dω =0and ID
m =2 Ic,t h u sb o t h
eﬀects of competition on growth are absent.
S i n c ew eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e dt h a tID
m < 21−αIc, this implies that ID
m < 2Ic and from (20) we can
conclude that competition increases the number of sectors with higher investment in innovation, thus
spurring long-run growth. This proves the positive eﬃciency eﬀect in proposition 2. The next step
is to show that this eﬀect dominates the negative eﬀect of competition on ID
m and Ic.S i n c edIc/dω,
dID
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thus proving that that the overall eﬀect of competition on growth is positive.
9.2 Proposition 2
Substituting ID
c = IF into the right hand side of (13) we obtain the following expression for domestic
income:













/dω<0, as i showed above, it is easy to see that ∂Y D/∂ω<0.
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Labor share 0.67 0.75
cons/GDP 0.86 0.85
TABLE II
Welfare Gains with optimal Subsidy
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
competition ω. 42 .47 .49 .54 .57 .62 .68
observed subsidy sD .066 .115 .115 .115 .12 .114 .188
optimal subsidy sD∗ .04 .065 .075 .1 .11 .13 .155
welfare gain β. 00009 .0004 .00024 .00004 .00001 .00005 .0003
















Source: OECD ANBERD (ISIC Rev.2)
31Figure 2. Global R&D investment shares by sector
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32Figure 4. Steady state equilibrium and the growth eﬀect
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33Figure 6. International R&D competition
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34Figure 8. Competition and welfare: robustness
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35Figure 9. Foreign competition and optimal domestic subsidy
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